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Advertising Traded Goods
This article focuses on returns to generic advertising for agricultural products that move
freely across political boundaries, hereafter referred to as “traded goods.”  Traded goods
represent the norm rather than the exception for the some 55 commodities covered by
promotion checkoffs (Forker and Ward, pp. 102-103; Neff and Plato).  Yet the scholarly
literature is virtually devoid of studies that elucidate the economic impacts of advertising
traded goods in any systematic fashion.  Early work by Nerlove and Waugh remains the
theoretical foundation for much of the literature on advertising benefit-cost analysis (e.g.,
see Ferrero et al.).  Nerlove and Waugh’s analysis, however, applies strictly to non-traded
goods.  Trade is taken into account in recent work by Piggott, Piggott and Wright and by
Kinnucan and Christian, but their models assume that the promoting industry is a net
exporter.  In an important paper, Alston, Carman and Chalfant consider the returns to
generic advertising in a small, open-economy setting, but their analysis is confined to a
graphical treatment of the problem and does not consider the net importer case.
The purpose of this research is to determine the effectiveness of generic
advertising in instances where the advertised good faces competition from foreign supplies
and trade barriers are low or absent so that open-economy conditions prevail.  The
analysis builds on Nerlove and Waugh’s theory of generic advertising by extending their
model to the traded-good case in which a portion of the advertising cost is shared with
consumers via “tax shifting” (Chang and Kinnucan).  The model is general in the sense
that trade status is endogenous.  That is, both the net importer and the net exporter case
can be analyzed with a simple redefinition of the trade variable.  For the net importer case,2
a parameter is included to take into account cost sharing with foreign producers when a
promotion levy is imposed on imports to prevent free riding. 
Following presentation of the model and comparative-static results, we apply the
model to egg advertising in California to demonstrate utility.  A key finding is that
ignoring trade can prejudice benefit-cost ratios in favor of the advertising program.  And
this is true even if trade exposure is modest.
Model
Consider a competitive industry that produces a tradeable good and that advertises strictly
in the domestic market.  Assume further that price is determined by market forces, not the
government.  The industry ordinarily exports a portion of its production, but depending
upon domestic supply and demand conditions, the trade status can change from net
exporter to net importer.  The domestic market for the industry’s product is integrated
with the world market so that the law of one price holds across all markets, domestic and
foreign.  The industry represents a sufficiently small portion of the total economy that the
supply and demand for goods that are related to the industry’s good through consumer
preferences or production technology can be safely ignored, at least as a first
approximation.
With these assumptions, and holding constant all exogenous factors that affect
supply and demand except advertising, the structural model for this industry that defines
initial equilibrium is:  
(1) q  = D(p, A) D
(2) q  = S(p) S3
(3) q  = T(p) T
(4) q  = q  - q   TS D
(5) R = p q  -,    S (t) dt - 6 1 A S0
q S- 1
where q  is the domestic quantity demanded, q  is the domestic quantity supplied, q  is the DS T
quantity traded, p is market price, A is domestic advertising expenditures, and R is net
economic surplus (quasi-rent) accruing to domestic producers.  
The endogenous variables in the system are assumed to be measured at the farm
level, i.e., the quantity variables, q , q  and q , are expressed in farm-equivalent units, p is TS D
the farm-gate price, and R is rent at the farm level.  Thus, D is a derived demand
relationship and S is a primary supply relationship.
The trade relation, T, differs in its interpretation depending on trade status.  If the
region exposed to the advertising (“domestic” market) is a surplus region with respect to
the advertised good (net exporter), q  > 0 and T is an export demand relation.  If the T
exposed region is a deficit region (net importer), q  < 0 and T is an import supply relation. T
    S  is the primary supply curve written in inverse form, i.e., price as a function of
-1
quantity in equation (2). The 6 term is an incidence parameter to account for “tax
shifting,” i.e., the hypothesis that a portion of the advertising cost is shifted to consumers
when advertising funds are raised through a per-unit levy in a competitive market (Chang
and Kinnucan).  6 is bounded between zero and one, and equals one when supply is fixed
or demand is perfectly elastic.
Following Nerlove and Waugh, A is treated as exogenous.  It appears as a shift
variable in the derived demand relation, even though advertising ordinarily occurs at retail. 4
Thus, we abstract from the marketing channel, a simplification that is innocuous as long as
the demand elasticity is measured at the farm level and the industry’s aggregate marketing
technology is fixed proportions (Kinnucan, 1997), a maintained hypothesis in this study.
When the trade status is net importer, a promotion tax is frequently levied on
imports to prevent free-riding.  In these instances, the cost of advertising is shared with
foreign producers.  The 1 parameter in (5) is the portion of the advertising funds collected
from domestic producers.  If no levy is imposed on imports, 1 = 1.0; otherwise 1 is a
positive fraction.
Analysis
The first task is to determine the effect of an increase in advertising on net producer
surplus.  For this purpose, express (1) - (5) in total differential form:
(1') dln q  = - ￿ dln p + ￿ dln A D
(2') dln q  =  ￿ dln p  S
(3') dln q  = e dln p T
(4') dln q  = (q  /q ) dln q  - (q  /q ) dln q           TS T S D T D
(5') dR =  p q  dln p -  6 1 dA S
where dln x (= dx/x) is the relative change in variable x, ￿ is the absolute value of the
domestic demand elasticity, ￿ is the domestic supply elasticity, e is the price elasticity
corresponding to the T function, and ￿ (= (0q  /0A) (A/q )) is a parameter that indicates DD
the percent change in demand associated with a 1% change in advertising expenditures,
holding prices constant, hereafter referred to as the “advertising elasticity.”  Given the
negative sign in equation (1), all elasticities except e are defined to be positive.  That is,5
the domestic supply curve is upward sloping, the domestic demand curve is downward
sloping, and adverting causes the domestic demand curve to shift to the right.
The sign of e depends on trade status.  For a net exporter, q  > 0 and e = e   is T D
interpreted as an export demand elasticity.  For a net importer, q  < 0 and e = e   is T S
interpreted as an import supply elasticity.  In this analysis, e  is assumed to be negative D
and e  is assumed to be positive.  Specifically, the excess demand function is non- S
increasing and the excess supply function is non-decreasing.
dR in (5') represents the change in net producer surplus (hereafter called “profit”)
associated with a small change in advertising expenditure. It can be seen that price
enhancement is a necessary condition for an increase in advertising to be profitable.  The
conditions conducive to price enhancement are determined by substituting (1') - (3') into
(4') and solving for dln p:
(6) dln p =  {￿ /[(1 + k) ￿ + ￿ - k e]} dln A 
where k = (q  /q ) is the “trade share.”  Note from (6) that regardless of trade status, TD
under the stated assumptions an increase in advertising always increases price (unless e is
plus or minus infinity).  For example, if the trade status is net importer, k < 0 and e  > 0,
which means that - k e in (6) is positive, so the total expression is positive.  (Since (1 + k)
= q /q  > 0, the first term in (6)’s denominator is always positive.)  Similarly, if the trade SD
status is net exporter, k > 0 and e < 0, which again produces a positive sign for - k e and
thus for (6).  
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That (6) represents a generalization of Nerlove and Waugh’s analysis can be seen
by considering their comparable expression (p. 818, equation (5)), which, in our notation,
is:
(7) dln p = [￿ / (￿ + ￿)] dln A. 
Comparing (6) and (7), it is evident that (6) reduces to (7) when k = 0.  Thus, Nerlove and
Waugh’s analysis applies to non-traded goods only. 
Both (6) and (7) are consistent in showing that advertising’s price-enhancement
ability increases as domestic supply or domestic demand becomes less elastic or as
consumers become more responsive to the advertising.  Direct inspection of (6) indicates
price enhancement is facilitated by a less elastic import supply or export demand curve,  as 
might be expected from Nerlove and Waugh’s analysis for the autarky case.    
Trade Share and Price Enhancement
Intuitively, one would expect an increase in trade share to diminish advertising’s price-
enhancement ability when advertising is confined to the domestic market.  For example, in
the net exporter case, an increase in export share would mean less of the total crop being
exposed to the advertising, and thus a weaker price effect.  This may be checked by setting
￿ = ￿ /[(1 +k) ￿ + ￿ - k e] in (6) and taking the derivative with respect to k to yield:
0￿/0k = ￿ (e - ￿) / [k (￿ - e) + ￿ + ￿]
2
For the net exporter case (k > 0 and e < 0),  0￿/0k  is negative, which means an increase in
export share always diminishes advertising’s price-enhancement ability when advertised
occurs in the domestic market.  Thus, intuition is confirmed in the net exporter case.   7
For the net importer case (k < 0 and e > 0), the effect of trade share on
advertising’s price-enhancement ability hinges on the relative magnitudes of the supply
elasticities.   For example, if import and domestic supply are equally elastic (e = ￿), 0￿/0k
= 0 and import share is irrelevant.  Conversely, if import supply is more elastic than
domestic supply (e > ￿), the usual case given small-nation effects and the inelasticity of
domestic supply response for most agricultural products, then 0￿/0k > 0.  The positive
derivative in this case implies that a decrease in imports (smaller negative value for k)
increases advertising’s price enhancement ability.
This result accords with intuition as well, but for a different reason than given for
the net exporter case.  In particular, in the net importer case, supply response, not
advertising exposure, is the operant factor.  This can be seen by noting that as import
share declines, so, too, does the portion of total supply that comes from the more elastic
source when ￿ < e.  With less quantity coming from the more elastic source, supply
response is attenuated, which enhances advertising’s price effect.
Fundamental Returns Equation for Traded Goods
The effect of a change in advertising expenditure on industry profit is obtained by
substituting (6) into (5'), which yields:  
(8) dR/dA = ￿ / [(1 + k) ￿ + ￿ - k e] - 6 1
where ￿ = ￿ p q  / A is loosely interpreted as the “...the marginal gross revenue from S
increased advertising expenditures, holding prices constant (sic)” (Nerlove and Waugh, p.
819). (If q  = q  (autarky), ￿ reduces to p 0q  /0A, in which case the interpretation is SD D
exact.)  Equation (8) indicates the net effect of a small change in advertising expenditure8
on net producer surplus, taking into account supply response in the domestic market,
equilibriating adjustments in the domestic and foreign markets in response to the demand
increase in the domestic market, and advertising cost shifting and sharing.  It is a net
measure of marginal returns in that it takes into account the incremental cost of the
advertising (see equation (5')).  
From (8) it is apparent that the marginal returns are positive, zero, or negative
depending on the relative magnitudes of the terms on either side of the second negative
sign, as the first term is non-negative by assumption.  Because the first term in essence
reflects advertising’s price enhancement ability, the previously discussed factors that
determine price enhancement also determine profitability.  
Small, Open-Economy Problem   
Consider now the issue raised by Alston, Carman and Chalfant with respect to advertising
in a small, open-economy.  A small, open-economy situation occurs when trade barriers
are absent and the crop represented by the promotion entity is too small in relation to the
total volume traded to affect price.  This situation arises most particularly (but not
exclusively) in the case of state-based promotion efforts.  For example, California
producers fund a wide variety of promotion programs through marketing orders and state
commissions (Carman, Cook and Sexton, p. 140), some of which are state-specific.  The
point made by Alston, Carman and Chalfant is that such programs may be futile in that
price enhancement is problematic.
The reason why price enhancement is problematic in a small, open-economy
situation is that the excess supply or demand curve is horizontal.  That is, the e parameter9
in (8) is negative infinity in the net exporter case and positive infinity in the net importer
case.  In either case, (8) reduces to  
dR/dA = - 6 1, 
which means that the industry suffers a marginal loss equal to the incidence parameter
(adjusted for cost-sharing with foreign producers, where applicable).  And this is true
regardless of the demand shift associated with the advertising, i.e., the magnitude of ￿, a
fact that highlights the dangers of single-equation modeling of advertising returns. 
Potential Biases from Ignoring Trade
[Omitted to conserve space.]
Optimal Advertising Expenditure for Traded Goods 
Industry profits from advertising are maximized when marginal net returns are zero, i.e.,
dR/dA = 0 in equation (8).  However, as noted by Nerlove and Waugh, an optimum
expenditure level computed in this manner is likely to overstate the true optimum in that it
ignores opportunity cost.  The opportunity cost of advertising funds can be incorporated
into the analysis by defining a parameter ’ that represents the marginal return on the next-
best use of advertising funds (e.g., production research, see Wohlgenant, 1993).  In this
case, industry profit is maximized when
dR/dA = ’.
Substituting (8) into this expression and solving for A (recalling that ￿ = ￿ p q  / A) yields  S
(9) A  =  pq ￿ / [((1 + k) ￿ + ￿ - k e) (6 1 + ’)] 
*
S
where A  represents the advertising expenditure that maximizes net producer surplus,
*
taking into account opportunity cost.  The optimal expenditure level varies directly with10
the factors that increase advertising’s price-enhancement ability (e.g., less elastic demand
or supply) and that lower the effective cost of the advertising to the domestic industry
(lower opportunity cost, levy share, or incidence).  Incidence is determined by supply and
demand elasticities as follows: 
(10) 6 = = / (; + =)
where = is the absolute value of the effective demand elasticity and ; is the effective
supply elasticity.
The effective demand and supply elasticities depend on trade status.  For the net
importer case,
(10a) = = ￿
(10b) ; = (1 + k) ￿ - k e , S
and for the net exporter case
(10c) = = (1 + k)  ￿  - (1 + k)  k   e
-1 -1
D
(10d) ; = ￿.
In essence, trade enlarges the supply or demand elasticity facing the industry, and this
affects incidence.   In a closed economy (k = 0), the situation examined by Chang and
Kinnucan, = = ￿ and ; = J and producer incidence is always 100% (6 = 1.00) when
supply is fixed (￿ = 0).  However, this is not necessarily true in an open economy (k g 0). 
In particular, as can be seen by comparing equations (10b) and (10d), producer incidence
is 100% with fixed domestic supply only if trade status is net exporter.
In the net importer case, a portion of supply comes from foreign producers, and as
long as this supply is not fixed, the effective supply elasticity (equation (10b)) is positive,11
which means that a portion of the advertising tax is always shifted to consumers (unless
domestic demand is perfectly elastic (see equation (10a)), which is not likely for
agricultural products).  One implication is that, ceteris paribus, a net importer situation
may provide a more favorable environment in which to promote than a net exporter
situation, at least from a cost-shifting perspective.  This insight was not available from
Chang and Kinnucan’s analysis, as their study did not consider trade.
Equation (9) may be compared to Nerlove and Waugh’s optimality condition (p.
822) for a non-traded good, which in our notation is:  
(11) A  ￿     =  pq  ￿ / [(￿ + ￿ ) (1 + ’)].
*
N-W S
Equation (9) reduces to (11) when there is no trade and producers bear the full incidence
of the promotion levy, i.e., k  = 0 and 6 = 1 = 1.  Thus, equations (9) and (10) represent a
generalization of Nerlove and Waugh’s theory of cooperative (generic) advertising.
Application
[Omitted to conserve space.]
Concluding Remarks
A basic theme of this paper is that advertising benefit-cost analysis can be improved if
models take into account trade relationships.  The only situation where this would not be
true is when non-competitive market structures, government intervention, or other factors
prevent the free flow of the advertised commodity across political boundaries.  In all other
situations, ignoring trade is liable to prejudice the analysis in favor of the advertising
program.  This may explain the preponderance of very favorable benefit-cost ratios in the12
literature, as most agricultural products are traded, but few advertising studies include
trade relationships.
The major contribution of this research is theory development.  In particular, our
analysis extends Nerlove and Waugh’s theory of cooperative (generic) advertising to the
case of traded goods where the advertising cost is shared with consumers through tax
shifting and, where applicable, with foreign producers through advertising import levies. 
It builds on the work of Alston, Carman and Chalfant by putting their graphical analysis
into mathematical form and by extending their analysis to the net importer case.  The net
importer case has some unique aspects, not the least of which is the expanded role for
supply response as a determinant of generic advertising effectiveness.13
References 
Alston, J. M., H. F. Carman, and J. A. Chalfant. “Evaluating Primary Product Promotion:
Returns to Generic Advertising by a Producer Cooperative in a Small, Open,
Economy.”  in Promotion in the Marketing Mix: What Works, Where, and Why.
E. W. Goddard and D. S. Taylor (editors). pp. 145-67. Guelph: University of 
Guelph: Ontario, Canada, 1994.
Chang, H.-S. and H. W. Kinnucan. “Economic Effects of an Advertising Excise Tax.”
Agribusiness. 7 (1991): 165-71.
Chavas, J.-P. And S. R. Johnson. “An Econometric Model of the US Egg Industry.”
Applied Economics. 13 (1981): 321-35.
Ferrero, J., L. Boon, H. M. Kaiser, and O. D. Forker. Annotated Bibliography of Generic
Commodity Promotion Research (Revised). NICPRE Research Bulletin 96-03,
Cornell University, 1996. 
Forker, O. D. and R. W. Ward. Commodity Advertising: The Economics and
Measurement of Generic Programs. New York: Lexington Books, 1993.
Houck, J. P. Elements of Agricultural Trade Policies. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1986.
Kinnucan, H. W. “A Note on Measuring Returns to Generic Advertising in Interrelated
Markets.”  J. Agr. Econ. 47 (1996): 261-67.
Kinnucan, H. W. “Middlemen Behavior and Generic Advertising Rents in Competitive
Interrelated Industries.” Aust. J. Agr. and Res. Econ. 41 (1997): 191-208.14
Kinnucan, H. W. and J. E. Christian. “A Method for Measuring Returns to Nonprice
Export Promotion with an Application to Almonds.” J. Agr. and Res. Econ. 22
(July 1997): 120-32.
Nerlove, M. and F. Waugh. “Advertising without Supply Control: Some Implications of a
Study of the Advertising of Oranges.” J. Farm Econ.  43 (1961): 813-37.
Piggott, R. R., N. E. Piggott, and V. E. Wright. “Approximating Farm-Level  Returns to
Incremental Advertising Expenditure: Methods and Application to the Australian
Meat Industry.”  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.  77 (1995): 497-511.
Wohlgenant, M. K. “Demand for Farm Output in a Complete System of Demand
Functions.” Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 71 (May 1989): 241-52.
Wohlgenant, M. K. “Distribution of Gains from Research and Promotion in Multi-Stage
Production Systems: The Case of U.S. Beef and Pork Industries.” Amer. J. Agr.
Econ. 75 (1993): 642-51.